

# SECURING THE FUTURE

HIL Cyber-Physical Testing Platform to Address  
the Challenges of Grid Digitalization



Louis Raymond


Market Development Manager - OPAL-RT



**OPAL-RT**  
TECHNOLOGIES

# INCREASING DYNAMIC RESPONSE AND COMPLEXITY

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# Enabling interoperability of multi-vendor high-voltage direct current (HVDC) grids

InterOPERA, funded by Horizon Europe, brings 21 European partners together from across the wind generation and transmission value chain to unlock the potential of multi-vendor HVDC systems and to foster transition of the European energy sector.

## Disclaimer



Co-funded by the European Union

Co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or CINEA. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

PROJECT DETAILS  
Duration: 1 January 2023 – 30 April 2027  
Grant agreement: 101095874

## INTEROPERABILITY


Numerous IEDs on the field  
Many comm. Protocols  
Multiple vendors

SIEMENS

## RENEWABLES

Decentralized production  
Intermittent (solar, wind)  
Multidirectional power flows  
Microgrids

ABB



## GRID OPERATION

Huge amount of controllable components  
Naturally unstable  
Need for synchronization  
High QoS expected

## TSO-DSO Challenges & Opportunities for the Digital EU Electricity System



## Executive summary

The report underscores the **critical need for digitalisation** to enhance grid operation, planning, and customer integration, which is essential for achieving global and European carbon emission reduction targets. The recommended solution is the development of digital twins (DTs), as virtual replicas of physical systems, tightly connected via indispensable communication interfaces. These cutting-edge technologies enable improved monitoring, prediction, and decision-making across the lifecycle of grid assets, from development and planning to operational monitoring and scenario simulation.


The power system faces several challenges today, including a rapid increase of distributed energy resources that must be integrated into the system, which requires coordinated planning and operational strategies. In addition, rapidly increasing demand in many countries necessitates timely and accurate investment decisions to ensure grid capacity. With increasing weather anomalies and weather-dependent production, advanced forecasting is fundamental for secure and optimal grid operation. Finally, the evolving **geopolitical situation** requires a robust, data-driven, and **resilient cyber defence** that safeguards the power system at all times, including when external entities try to sabotage its operation.

Implementing DTs will contribute to solving major challenges and exploiting opportunities. They will provide relevant insights for informed decision-making for grid planning and system operation, leading to improved security of supply and grid utilisation, as well as enabling customer integration to increase flexibility. This digitalisation effort supports creating a sustainable, secure, and competitive energy market.

The joint task force emphasises the importance of addressing key challenges to digitalisation for the future of the EU electricity system. Fundamental barriers are connected to data quality, standardisation, and access.



# CYBERSECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN POWER SYSTEM SECTOR



## NEWS

### First Network Code on Cybersecurity for the electricity sector has been published

24 May 2024

#### DSO Entity and ENTSO-E Joint Statement on Cyber Security Network Code

Today, the European Union published the first-ever [EU Network Code on Cybersecurity](#) for the electricity sector. The publication is an important step to improve the cyber resilience of critical EU energy infrastructure and services.

The new Network Code on Cybersecurity has been developed in response to the growing digitalisation and interconnection of national power systems. It provides a common standard to ensure the security and reliability of the interconnected system.



Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)



## OPAL-RT TECHNOLOGIES



17,642 followers

5d • Edited • 🌐

⚡ A fantastic close to XX **ERiac 2025** in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay — and we're returning home with an award!

🏆 We're thrilled to share that **Thais Marzalek Blasi's** paper, "Cyber-Physical Co-Simulation Platform for Cybersecurity Studies in Electric Power Systems," received 2nd place for Best Paper presented at Study Committee D2 (CIGRE) during the event!

This honorable recognition is strong validation of our work advancing real-time cybersecurity research through co-simulation — powered by our Cyber-Physical solution with EXata.

📄 Check out the paper here (Access requires XXERiac 2025 credentials):

[https://lnkd.in/d5\\_NJYw5](https://lnkd.in/d5_NJYw5)

Curious to learn more? Feel free to reach out—we'd love to share insights!

Thank you to everyone who attended Thais's session and visited our booth to engage with her and **Rita Kwiek** on the future of cyber resilience in electric power systems.

# CYBER THREATS ON POWER GRID

Modern power grids are Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) composed of electrical and information infrastructure

Wide deployment of new technologies

Substation, transmission and distribution automation

More Distributed Energy Resources (DER)

Advanced two-way communication networks

Development of synchrophasor systems

**New technologies, new challenges on cyber security: Accidental<sup>1)</sup> and Malicious**

## Cyber-Physical System (CPS)

Conventional power grid



Communication network infrastructure




1) See [NIST Program "Cybersecurity for Smart Grid Systems"](#)




# TESTING APPROACHES


## MODEL/SOFTWARE-IN-THE-LOOP




## RAPID CONTROL PROTOTYPING



## HARDWARE-IN-THE-LOOP



## POWER HIL






# REAL-TIME Co-Simulation

# CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEM CO-SIMULATION


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- Transition of traditional grids to smart grids brings challenges
- Near impossible to perform cybersecurity research in real environment
- CPS testbed: integration of physical and cyber systems within a simulation environment
- Different simulation testbeds: offline, real time
  - Synchronization is the main challenge in offline co-simulation testbed
  - Real time testbed does not have same synchronization problem
  - Ability to interface hardware devices such as controllers, SCADA systems in real time testbed



# CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM CO-SIMULATION


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# REAL-TIME SIMULATION OF POWER GRID


- Real time simulation (RTS) definition
- RTS simulates a wide range of frequencies for different applications
  - Phasor domain
  - Electromagnetic transients
  - Fast electromagnetic transients
- Support of Analog, Digital I/Os and Communication Protocols such as
  - C37.118,
  - Modbus,
  - IEC 61850,
  - etc



# REAL-TIME SIMULATION OF COMMUNICATION NETWORK

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- Any CPS testbed must be able to model high fidelity communication network
- Network types such as satellite, wired, wireless, 5G can be designed
- Components such as switches, nodes, routers, satellite, connected to one another via communication links
- Cyber attacks such as packet modification, packet delay, hacking, social engineering (phishing email), DOS initiated, vulnerability exploitation, worm and virus propagation on nodes



# Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Co-Simulation Testbed




# INTEGRATED CYBER-PHYSICAL SIMULATION

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Seamlessly combine advanced power grid simulation with cutting-edge communication network modeling in a single platform.

With built-in support for a wide range of communication protocols - including IEC 61850, DNP3, Modbus, and more - we enable realistic testing of system interactions, optimizing workflows and minimizing latency.




# COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS

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## Supported Communication Protocols with EXata CPS(Ethernet-Based)

- IEC61850 GOOSE, SV & MMS
- C37.118
- DNP3
- IEC 60870-5-104
- TCP/IP, UDP/IP
- Modbus TCP




- Time Synchronization Interface

# CYBER-PHYSICAL POWER SYSTEMS (CPPS) TESTBED

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## Virtual Power Grid



## + Virtual Communication Network



2025-06-11



## Physical Devices & Systems (SCADA, Relays, PMUs, IEDs, Controllers, etc)



Digital I/Os

Analog I/Os


Time Synchronization (IRIG-B, 1PPS, IEEE 1588 PTP)

Communication Protocols (DNP3, IEC 61850, Modbus, C37.118, OPC-UA, IEC-104, etc.)



# SOLUTION FOR CYBERSECURITY APPLICATIONS


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# EXata CPS



# INTEGRATION OF GRID AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Communication System Emulators (**EXata CPS**) can be inserted at all levels to analyze performance and sensitivity to cyberattacks and to analyze counter-measures



# CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SIMULATION OVERVIEW

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## - MODELING, MAPPING, VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION LINK

The screenshot displays the EXata software interface, which is used for configuring and running simulations. The main window shows a 2D network topology with nodes and links. A dialog box titled "Connections between EXata nodes and Operational Hosts" is open, showing a table of connections. The table has four columns: "EXata Node IP Address", "IP Address Input Type", "OPAL-RT Device", and "Interface Name". The connections are listed from 1 to 10. Node 4 is highlighted in the table and in the 2D view. The 3D view shows a terrain with various nodes and links.


	EXata Node IP Address	IP Address Input Type	OPAL-RT Device	Interface Name
1	1 --> 190.0.1.1	File	publ_BESS1_ref	ex_eth17
2	2 --> 190.0.1.2	File	publ_PCC	ex_eth12
3	3 --> 190.0.1.3	File	publ_BESS_3	ex_eth9
4	4 --> 190.0.1.4	File	publ_PV	ex_eth7
5	5 --> 190.0.1.5	File	publ_Load4	ex_eth16
6	6 --> 190.0.1.6	File	publ_BESS_2	ex_eth8
7	7 --> 190.0.1.8	File	publ_CHP	ex_eth11
8	8 --> 190.0.1.9	File	publ_Load3	ex_eth15
9	9 --> 190.0.1.10	File	publ_Load1	ex_eth13
10	10 --> 190.0.1.11	File	publ_BESS_1	ex_eth6

Tip: Virtual Nodes can be configured via Connection Manager also

Buttons: Apply, OK, Cancel

Defensive Model

- Firewall models
- Interface with attack generators & IDS

Routing Misconfiguration  
Attack(Man-in-the-middle)


# PRE-BUILT CYBERATTACK & DEFENSE LIBRARY



Model Name	Model Type
Adaptive Attacks	Attack Model
Anonymous On-demand Routing (ANODR) Protocol	Routing Protocol
Botnet Worm and Virus Attacks	Attack Model
CPU and Memory Resource Model	OS Resource Model
Credential Model: IFF Certificate	Network Layer
Data Transfer Attacks	Attack Model
Denial of Service (DOS) Attacks	Attack Model
File Attacks	Attack Model
Firewall Model	Network Layer
Hacking Attacks	Attack Model
Host Model	Application Layer
Information Assurance Hierarchical Encryption Protocol (IAHEP)	Network Layer
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) Model	Network Layer
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol with Internet Key Exchange (ISAKMP-IKE)	Network Layer
Malware Virus Attacks	Attack Model
Malware Worm Attacks	Attack Model
Modify Packets Attacks	Attack Model
Network Scanning Attacks	Attack Model
Phishing Email Attacks	Attack Model
Port Scanning Attacks	Attack Model
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Model	Network Layer

- Accelerate your cybersecurity testing with a readily available library of programmable attack and defense models.
- Simulate real threats like man-in-the-middle, denial-of-service, and spoofing, while testing countermeasures such as firewalls and antivirus solutions—saving months of development time.

Model Name	Model Type
Ransomware Attacks	Attack Model
Remote Access Attacks	Attack Model
Rootkit Attacks	Attack Model
Secure Neighbor Model	Network Layer
Vulnerability Attacks	Attack Model
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and CTR with CBC-MAC (CCMP) Model	MAC Layer
Wormhole Model	MAC Layer



General Properties	
Property	Value
[.] Command Type	Attack Command
Attack Name	Multiply_attack
[.] Attack Type	Modify Packets
Attacker Node	13
[.] Layer Type	MAC
[.] MAC Layer Filter	Yes
Source MAC Address	ANY
Destination MAC Address	01-0C-CD-01-00-19
Ethernet Type	ANY
[.] MODP Attack Type	Flow Modification
Number of Flow Modifications	0
[.] MODP Attack Type	Data Modification
[.] Number of Data Modifications	1
[.] Data Modification Type [0]	Multiply
[.] Multiply Type [0]	Value
Value Type [0]	16 Bit Unsigned Integer
Start Byte [0]	114
Multiply Value [0]	2

Generate Attack HITL Command


Save

Cancel




# UKRAINE CYBER ATTACK SIMULATION (SCADA)

- Scenario based on cyber-attack which caused outage on Ukraine power grid in 2015
- Power grid model in HYPERSIM
- Network model with grid operators, SCADA HMI
- Attacks:
  - Social engineering attack -> phishing email
  - Worm infecting PCs, stealing credentials of SCADA HMI operator workstation
- Attacker uses remote connection to SCADA HMI workstation and causes power outage by opening breakers



# HIL MICROGRID CONTROL (IEC 61850)


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- Communication topology based on IEC 61850
- GOOSE messages transmitted between Controller and IEDs assigned to DERs
- Simulated network is between IEDs at bay level, Microgrid controller at station level, and a switch

# HIL MICROGRID CONTROL (IEC 61850)

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# DEFENDING AGAINST COORDINATED CYBER-ATTACKS ON A 5G-ENABLED MICROGRID

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Hybrid simulation of a  
Microgrid system



EMT (Electromagnetic  
Transients) simulation



Cyber-attack modeling

Analyze the effects of  
various cyber threats on  
Power Systems,  
particularly focusing on  
Microgrids with  
Distributed Energy  
Resources (DERs).

